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In Book rn, Part I of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume develops two 
arguments: CD moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense; ® we 
cannot derive any proposition involving 'ought' from propositions involv-
ing only 'is.' 
(1) Moral Distinctions Are Derived From a Moral Sense 
(1) 
Hume says that moral distinctions cannot be derived from reason. Moral 
distinctions, according to Hume, are drawn as to whether a person's ac-
tion, sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious. 
If such distinctions cannot be derived from reason, where are they deriv-
(2) 
ed from? Hume says, "Moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense." 
(I) Hume, D.: A Treatise of Human Nature-Being an Attempt to Introduce the Ex-
perimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, 1739-1740, in: David Hume 
- The Philosophical Works,ed.by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 4 Vols, London 
1874-1875, Scientia Verlag, Aalen 1964, Vol. IT, p. 235. 
(2) Hume, D.,ibid., pp. 246-247. 
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If a person's action, sentiment, or character gives us an agreeable impres-
(3) 
sion, we feel that his/her action, sentiment, or character is virtuous. If his 
action, sentiment, or character gives us an uneasy impression, we feel that 
his action, sentiment, or character is vicious. According to Hume, an 
agreeable or uneasy impression is the criterion of morality. 
(2) 'Is' and 'Ought' 
Let's turn to the second argument. Hume says that we cannot derive any 
proposition involving 'ought' from propositions involving only 'is.' 
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observa-
tions concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, 
that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet 
with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. 
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. 
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirma-
tion,'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the 
same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether in-
conceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
(4) 
which are entirely different from it." 
(3) A Fault of Hume's Ethical Theory 
If we accept Hume's first argument (that is to say, moral distinctions are 
(3) From this point "his" will be substituted for "his/her" and is assumed to be 
non-gender specific. 
(4) Hume, D., ibid., pp. 245-246. 
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derived from a moral sense), a difficult problem arises. When person A 
feels person C's action to be agreeable, but person B feels person C's ac-
tion to be uneasy, is person C's action virtuous or vicious? An ethical 
theory depending exclusively upon a moral sense or other subjective 
elements must face the difficult problem of relativism. 
(5) 
In 'Utilitarianism & Welfare Economics,' I stated the following: 
1. One of the characteristics of modern philosophy has been the inclina-
tion toward subjectivity, and this inclination has entailed relativism. 
[Hume is one of the most important philosophers who have this in-
clination.] 
2. Analytic philosophers in the 20th century have analyzed 'the subjec-
tivity of value judgement,' and their analysis reached its peak with R. 
M. Hare's The Language of Morals (1952). 
3. Hare uses the word 'prescriptivity' to describe the subjectivity of 
value judgement. 
4. But a turn in thinking had already begun at that point. Hare's later 
works can be interpreted as attempts to salvage the cognition of the 
subjectivity of value judgement from the morass of relativism. 
In § 2~ § 4 I will investigate the effectiveness of Hare's ethical theory 
when dealing with relativism in the realm of value. In § 5 the relation bet-
ween 'is' and 'ought' will be discussed. 
§ 2 Universal Prescription 
I think that the key concepts of Hare's ethical theory are 'universal 
(5) Yoshizawa, M.: Utilitarianism & Welfare Economics, in: 1IJ1;;~~iJ'r*"f:;j\E1:iHlf 
'1E~i1"ti~Jl Vo!. 14, No. 4, March, 1992, p. 43. 
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prescription' and 'critical moral thinking.' We begin with the first. 
(1) Red and Good 
One of the most important conclusions in The Language of Morqls is that 
(6) 
all value words have descriptive and evaluative functions. Let's examine the 
following three sentences. 
1. This is a red car. 
2. This is a good car. 
3. He is a morally good man. 
The word 'red' in the first sentence describes a characteristic concern-
ing the color of the car. What about, then, the word 'good' in the second 
sentence? A man, who says, "This is a good car," must have criteria of 
goodness for a car: for example, a car which consumes too much gasoline 
is not a good car; a car which often has mechanical troubles is not a good 
car, etc. All cars which meet his criteria are good cars.ln other words, it is 
impossible that one car which meets his criteria is a good car, while 
another car which, too, meets his criteria is not a good car. 
What are the criteria of moral goodness? : for example, a man who often 
breaks his promises is not a good man; a man who is not kind to others is 
not a good man, etc. The word' good', too, describes certain characteristics 
of the man in question. 
Value words, however, have not only the function of description, but also 
the function of evaluation. We can understand this by comparing the word 
'red' in the first sentence with the word 'good' in the second and third 
(6) Hare R. M.: The Language of Morals, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1952, Chap. 7 / 
Freedom and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963, Chap. 2. 
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sentences.A man who says，“This is a red car，" tels only the color of the 
car. On the other hand， when a man says，“This is a good car， " he not only 
tels that the car in question does not consume too much gasoline， and that 
the car seldom has mechanical troubles， etc.， he recommends this car， too. 
Since value words have the function of evaluation， 'evaluating something 
to be good' implies ‘an attitude to recommend it.' Similarly， a man， who 
says，“He is a morally good man，" not only tels that he has never broken 
his promises， and that he has always been kind to others， etc.， but also 
praises him. 
Thus， moral words have both the function of description and evaluation. 
Because of the descriptive power of moral words， moral principles or moral 
judgements expressed by them can be universally applied to al things 
which fulfil the criteria in question. On the other hand， because of the 
evaluαtive power of moral words， moral principles or moral judgements 
have power to‘recommend' or‘prescribe.' Therefore， universal prescriP-
tion does exist. In other words， what cannot be universally prescribed can-
not be called a moral principle or moral judgement. 
(2) Debt and Imprisonment 
(7) 
Let's consider the following example: 
1. Person A owes money to person B. 
2. Person B owes money to person C. 
3. It is the law that creditors may exact their debt by putting their deb-
tors into prison. 
Can person B make thejudgement “I ought to put person A into prison" ? 
(7) Hare， R.M.: Freedo問。ndR，ιaso河， pp. 90-91. 
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Of course, he can. But, if he makes this judgement, and if, moreover, he re-
mains a moral man, there will be a curious outcome. If he makes the judge-
ment "I ought to put person A into prison," because of the descriptive 
power of the word 'ought,' he must agree to the judgement "Person C 
ought to put me into prison," because the relation between person A and 
person B is equal to the relation between person B and person C. 
Moreover, if he agrees to the judgement "Person C ought to put me into 
prison," because of the evaluative power of the word 'ought,' he must even 
prescribe person C to put him into prison. 
After undergoing the above reasoning, person B will usually abandon 
the judgement "I ought to put person A into prison." 
§ 3 Critical Moral Thinking 
(1) Conflict of Moral Principles 
According to Hare, the extent of moral problems, which can be solved 
by excluding principles, or judgements which cannot be universally 
prescribed, is not large. On the contrary, most difficult problems of morals 
arise from the conflicts of moral principles which can be universally 
prescribed, or the conflicts of moral duties which are derived from univer-
sal prescriptions (or, moral principles). 
'Keep your promises,' 'Be kind to your friends,' or 'Help a drowning per-
son,' --all these principles can be universally prescribed. But these 
universal prescriptions can conflict with each other. 
(8) 
For example: 
1. 1 promised my children to take them for a picnic next Sunday. 
(8) Hare, R. M.: Moral Thinking--Its Levels, Method and Point, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1981, pp. 26-27. 
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2. On Sunday, my friend, who has been abroad for many years, comes 
to my house and wants to be shown round my workplace. 
In this case I must make a choice between breaking my promise and not be-
ing kind to my friend. 
(9) 
A much more serious example: 
1. A sailor falls overboard from a naval destroyer while pursuing an 
enemy submarine. 
2. If the commander of the destroyer does not drop depth-charges, the 
submarine will escape to sink more ships and kill more people. 
3. But if he drops them, he will kill the sailor in the water. 
Which action should he choose, 'to drop depth-charges' or 'not to drop 
them' ? 
(2) Two Levels of Moral Thiking 
To cope with difficult problems resulting from the conflicts of moral 
(10) 
duties, Hare presents a theory which divides moral thiking into two levels. 
To solve moral problems by means of this theory is the main subject of his 
Moral Thinking. He divides moral thinking into the intuitive and the 
critical. If moral duties conflict, and if man remains at the intuitive level of 
moral thinking, this conflict of moral duties cannot be solved. But, if man 
enters the critical level of moral thinking, the conflict of moral duties may 
be solved. What, then, is done by this critical moral thinking? Before in-
vestigating the role of critical moral thinking, I must explain the concept 
(9) Hare, R. M., ibid., p. 29. 
(10) Hare, R. M., ibid., pp. 25-28. 
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of prima facie principle. Moral principles accepted by people at the intuitive 
level are prima facie principles which are temporarily right. But if two 
prima facie duties derived from two prima facie principles conflict, one of 
them must be abandoned. 
(11) 
Thus, critical moral thinking performs two roles as follow: 
1. It selects the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive 
thinking. 
2. It solves the conflict of prima facie principles. 
(3) An Example of Critical Moral Thinking 
Probably every doctor will agree with the two following principles: CD 
man must not give others pain; CD a doctor must do his best to keep the pa-
tient alive. These two principles can conflict.Imagine a doctor facing a 
(12) 
state in which: 
1. the patient will die at once if not put under intensive care; 
2. if the patient is put under intensive care, he will suffer a great deal 
and die in any case within a month or so; 
3. the doctor has a very strong moral aversion to omitting any step 
which could prolong life. 
This doctor is forced to make a moral decision, because the two moral 
principles 'man must not give others pain' and 'a doctor must do his best to 
keep the patient alive' conflict. If the doctor enters critical moral thinking, 
his reasoning will be likely to undergo the following process: CD he asks 
(11) Hare, R. M., ibid., pp. 49·50. 
(12) Hare, R. M., ibid., pp. 177·182. 
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himself how he would feel if he were the patient;①he then compares the 
amount of，仰inwhich he would then suffer and the amount ofμin which 
would result介vmomitting some ste.ρ's necessaηtoρroloηgl俳;①ifhethinks 
that the former exceeds the latter， he will modify the principle ‘a dotcor 
must do his best to keep the patient alive， and， therefore， must not omit 
any step which could prolong life，' into the principle ‘a doctor must do his 
best to keep the patient alive， and， therefore， must not omit any step which 
could prolong life， exceρt in the case in question.' 
Thus， through modification of the principle， the problem of conflicting 
duties could be solved. 
~ 4 An Implication of Hare's Ethical Theory 
Moral judgement derives from a moral sense or some other feeling， both 
of which are subjective. But it is not a sheer expression of desire. It is a 
universalρrescripti仰;that is to say， man who issues a universal prescrip-
tion is also regulated by it[ S 2]. In the meantime， a universal prescription 
accepted by a man can conflict with another universal prescription ac-
cepted by the same man， and then it is necessary to modiちTone of them by 
critical moral thinking [ S 3J. 
A more serious difficulty arises when a universalρrescription accepted by a 
man conflicts with another universalρrescr争tionacc.ゆtedby another man.I 
think Hare's ethical theory implies the following: 
Both person A's universalρrescription which is acquired by ‘perfect' 
critical moral thinking and person B's universal ρrescr;争tionwhich， too， 
is acquired by ‘perfect' critical moral thinking are morally legitimate， 
even when their universal prescriptions conflict. 
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If， even when people did ‘perfect' critical moral thinking， there would be 
conflicts of universal prescriptions， we could not get out of the morass of 
relativism. But 1 think we need not conclude so， atleast not now.Because 
we human beings are a long distance from ‘perfect' critical moral thinking. 
Namely， we cannot decide， atleast not now， which of the following proposi-
tions is true;‘even when people did “perfect" critical moral thinking， 
there would be conflicts of universal prescriptions' or ‘when people did 
“perfect" critical moral thinking， their most fundamental universal 
prescriptions would converge.' 
Before leaving this question， 1 wish to state that: hoping that when peoJうた
め》ωject'critical moral thinking， their most fundamental universalρrescr:争-
tions will converge， 1 will continue to preach the indispensability of critical 
moral thinking. 
~ 5 The Relation Between ‘Is' and ‘Ought' 
1 think it is impossible to refute Hume's argument that propositions in-
volving ‘ought' are on an entirely different plane from propositions involv-
ing only ‘is' [s 1(2)J. But we must not forget the fact that a universal 
prescription involving ‘ought' is issued by a human being， and that he is 
usually affected by knowledge derived from propositions involving only 
‘is'. In this sense，‘is' affects ‘ought' indirectly. Or， more strictly speaking， 
propositions not involving ‘ought' affects a human being's critical moral 
thinking indirectly. 
* * * 
In ‘Utilitarianism & Welfare Economics [ S 11(2)]' 1 presented three con-
clusions concerning income distribution. 
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1. We ought to let market mechanism determine people's incomes. 
2. We ought to help people whose income is insufficient to provide a 
decent living. In other words， we ought to establish and maintain an in-
stitution of social security which inc1udes health insurance， unemploy-
ment insurance， a pension scheme， public assistance and so on. 
3. Although we may adopt a progressive income tax and a progressive 
inheritance tax， we must be careful not to let the degree of pro-
gressiveness go too far. 
It is my hope that if we succeed in getting the few who， atfirst， disagree 
with my conclusions， todo critical moral thinking， they， too， wi1l come to 
agree with them in the end. 
* 1wish to express my appreciation to Mr. R. L. Reinoos for reading my 
manuscript and correcting it. 
